In the wider European Union, countries like the United Kingdom or Hungary are as much afflicted by structural deficiencies as some peripheral eurozone countries are.

The peripheral countries suffer from severe stock and flow imbalances.

Sooner rather than later, other periphery countries will also need help.

Other peripheral countries already have Greek style problems of debt sustainability and eroded competitiveness. Portugal, for example, may eventually have to restructure its debt and exit the euro.

Other peripheral countries already have Greek style problems of debt sustainability and eroded competitiveness.

The peripheral countries might just experience enough growth to sustain their ambitious austerity commitments.

Meanwhile, not only is fiscal austerity pushing the eurozone periphery into economic free fall, but the loss of competitiveness there will persist as relief at the waning prospect of disorderly defaults strengthens the euro s value.

If the peripheral countries remain mired in a deflationary trap of high debt, falling output, weak competitiveness, and structural external deficits, eventually they will be tempted by a third option default and exit from the eurozone.

Over the last two years, the eurozone's other peripheral countries have proven their capacity for adjustment, by reducing their fiscal deficits, expanding exports, and moving to current account surpluses, thereby negating the need for financing.

Thus, Germany and the eurozone core have increasingly outsourced official financing of the eurozone s distressed members to the ECB. If Italy and Spain are illiquid but solvent, and large scale financing provides enough time for austerity and economic reforms to restore debt sustainability, competitiveness, and growth, the current strategy will work and the eurozone will survive.

Thus, Germany and the eurozone core have increasingly outsourced official financing of the eurozone s distressed members to the ECB.

There is also the unresolved question of how much the periphery countries really should be asked to pay on their debilitating debt burdens, whatever the tax instrument.

And that paradox is now affecting even the core.

The other eurozone countries are not as competitive as Germany at today s exchange rate.

We have both countries inside and outside the Eurozone.

A eurozone candidate's inflation must not be more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three best performing EU states for one year. But the three countries that prospective members can be compared to may be outside the eurozone.

But the three countries that prospective members can be compared to may be outside the eurozone.

Second, all eurozone countries are effectively in the same boat.

At this point, peripheral countries will regain their fiscal sovereignty and will be able to ignore Reinhart and Rogoff s warning at their own risk.

Rebalancing the Eurozone

Demokratisasi di Eurozone

How could a eurozone supervisor be based outside the eurozone?

Over time, the eurozone countries would inevitably have to refinance most of Greece s public debt.

Back in 2010, creditor countries were concerned about contagion to the rest of the eurozone.

Fortunately, however, some peripheral countries are now being forced by their creditors to undertake drastic reforms not only of their labor markets, but also of their service sectors.

Both could therefore sponsor the indispensable compromise between the eurozone s stronger and weaker countries.

London vs. the Eurozone

The Euro Zone s Default Position

The Eurozone s Delayed Reckoning

The Eurozone s False Recovery

In a debt restructuring, the northern eurozone countries (including France) will see hundreds of billions of euros go up in smoke.

The love has been very tough indeed, generating rapid economic contraction, massive unemployment (upwards of 50 among young people), and continued fiscal deterioration, owing to rising debt service costs. Indeed, all eurozone members are now experiencing weak economic growth, if not recession.

The first step in such a process would probably be the eurozone s division into sub areas, comprising countries of relatively equal resilience.

Fiscal transfers, whereby eurozone countries commit to provide funds to their distressed counterparts, could also work.

Second, member states relinquished some control over their banks, in order to boost the system s overall stability.

Indeed, all eurozone members are now experiencing weak economic growth, if not recession.

Not surprisingly, workers are leaving the eurozone s crisis countries, but not necessarily for its stronger northern region.

Meanwhile, the eurozone core (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and France) comprised the producers of first and last resort, spending below their incomes and running ever larger current account surpluses.

A Survival Strategy for the Eurozone

Indicators for the eurozone are even worse.

Brady Bonds For the Eurozone

Eurozone Chutzpah and the IMF

The False Promise of a Eurozone Budget

The Eurozone s Last Stand

The Eurozone s Minsky Conundrum